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ABSTRACT
John Dugard’s courageous inaugural lecture drew on American realism, modern natural 
law and South Africa’s liberal tradition to argue that judges might better serve the ends 
of justice if they recognised their creative role, and replaced their subconscious preju-
dices and preferences with liberal values of the common law. This turn to legal realism 
to understand South Africa law was a significant intellectual development. However, its 
implications remain undeveloped within the theory and practice of law in South Africa. 
(Critical )legal realism raises significant questions about the nature of law and its role 
in sustaining public and private power. The lessons of legal realism in relation to the 
dominant legal method (formalism) and the nature of private law were not really taken up 
by lawyers and legal academics under apartheid. This meant that South African lawyers 
were ill-prepared for the challenges of transformation in the legal system, especially in 
relation to legal method, the form and content of private law and the development of law 
under ss 8 and 39(2) of the Constitution. Moreover, while progressive lawyers have always 
recognised the political nature of law – especially under apartheid – this has not always 
translated into a deeper understanding of how the form and content of our democratic 
Constitution is contested, and how law and politics seep into one another.
i  introduCtion
In 1971, John Dugard delivered his inaugural address at the University of 
the Witwatersrand.1 South Africa had began to experience, from the 1960s, 
one of the most brutal periods of apartheid authoritarianism in which the 
90-day detention morphed into indefinite detention without trial, political 
opposition was largely criminalised and political resistance had been driven 
underground. Attempts to challenge the 90- and 180-day detention laws in 
court were met by ‘executive-minded’ judges, who deferred to the will of 
Parliament expressed in and through these laws.
For Dugard, the problem was two-fold. It lay firstly in the judiciary’s narrow 
approach to its interpretive function, and a limited positivist notion of law as 
‘the command of the sovereign’ in which the duty of courts was to ‘interpret 
the will of parliament law “but not to reason why”’. Secondly, it was located 
in a ‘rigid distinction between law and morality’ and a consequent ‘rejection 
of legal values’ as important in the judicial process.2
In seeking a coherent means by which to challenge the dominant judicial 
approach, he wrote:
*  Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand.
**  Judge of the High Court, Western Cape. Hon Professor of Law, University of Cape Town.
1 ‘The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty’ (1971) 88 SALJ 181.
2 Ibid 187. 
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I would suggest the following two antidotes. First, a frank recognition on the part of the judi-
ciary that their role is not purely mechanical, that while interpreting a statute they may create 
new law by filling in gaps in the statute; and that in dispute between individual and State 
subconscious personal preferences are an ever-present hazard. Secondly, what is needed is 
a conscious determination by judges to be guided by accepted traditional legal values in the 
exercise of their limited legislative function.3
Drawing on American realism, modern natural law and a long, if fragile, liberal 
legal tradition in South Africa, Dugard argued that the judiciary might better 
serve the ends of justice if judges recognised their creative role, and replaced 
their subconscious prejudices and preferences (’inarticulate premises’) with 
‘accepted traditional legal values’ designed to ‘foster … the well-being and 
free development of the individual’.4 In Dugard’s view such ‘enlightened legal 
values’ were part of our Roman-Dutch legal tradition,5 were drawn on in statu-
tory interpretation and had always informed the development of the common 
law. In his later book, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order,6 a 
devastating evaluation of South Africa’s apartheid laws against human rights 
standards, Dugard expressed the wish that such a ‘realist-cum-value-oriented 
approach’ might also revive an interest in the Bill of Rights in South Africa – 
thus shifting our legal system from reliance on an increasingly impoverished 
notion of the rule of law to a clear reliance on substantive standards of justice.7
For Dugard, this ‘plea for a new approach to law’ was irretrievably tied to 
the future legitimacy of the legal system:
If faith is to be restored in the South African legal system while there is yet time sweeping 
changes will need to be made to the entire edifice of our law. A new Constitution with a 
Bill of Rights to provide legal safeguards for individual liberty, anti-discrimination laws to 
educate an unenlightened and prejudiced people, and a concerned and courageous legal pro-
fession committed to the enforcement of human rights are the very minimum requirements.8
Dugard’s realist emphasis on the judicial role, his liberal insistence on the 
place of the higher values of natural law in our legal system and his call for a 
Bill of Rights were insightful and particularly courageous at that bleak time.9 
3 Ibid 195.
4 Ibid 197.
5 In Human Rights and the SA Legal Order (1978) 30, he listed them as ‘freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and detention without trial, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment; the right to legal 
representation when the individual’s liberty is at stake; the right to be heard in one’s own defence 
before one’s liberty is curtailed; equality before the law; freedom or speech and literary expression; 
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and freedom’.
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid chapter 12.
8 Ibid 402.
9 Ironically in the same volume of the SALJ which published Dugard ‘s lecture, Ellison Kahn wrote 
a tribute to the retiring Chief Justice, LC Steyn (1971) 88 SALJ 1 which concluded ‘the premature 
retirement of Mr Justice Steyn has been greatly regretted in all legal circles … may I say that 
academics join their ranks and at the same time voice an appreciation of the invaluable and inef-
faceable contribution of the retired Chief Justice to the understanding and development of our law 
and the preservation of its underlying principle’ (7-8). It was Steyn who, in stark contrast to Dugard, 
said: ‘It would be an evil day for the administration of justice if our courts should deviate from the 
well-recognised tradition of giving politics as wide a berth as their work permits. It is one thing, 
and a very proper one, for a judge to point out defects in a statute or to draw attention to results, in 
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Drawing on the work and ideas of Dugard, and other progressive lawyers, this 
article examines their resonance under apartheid and their relevance today.
We suggest that Dugard correctly identified the fundamental nature of law 
and the implications for adjudication, that law is neither neutral nor value free 
and that judges have considerable law-making power. These insights were 
as important under apartheid as they are today, raising significant questions 
about the nature of law and its role in sustaining public and private power. 
Taking Dugard’s attention to realism as a starting point, we briefly set out, 
in part II, the main tenets and implications of critical legal realism for under-
standing law in South Africa. We then examine, in part III, how the lessons 
of legal realism in relation to the dominant legal method (formalism) and the 
nature of private law were never really taken up by progressive lawyers in 
South Africa under apartheid, although there was often a clear understanding 
of the contested and political nature of law. In part IV we explore how the 
failure to appreciate legal realism left us ill-prepared for the challenges of 
transformation in the legal system, especially in relation to legal method, the 
form and content of private law and the development of law under ss 8 and 
39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South African, 1996.10 We also 
examine how the ascendancy of a liberal democratic Constitution has enabled 
important democratic protections and transformative judgments. However, 
both the form and content of democracy remains contested.
In part V we conclude that the ongoing failure to examine and address the 
implications of critical legal realism has limited our ability to engage in the 
transformation of the legal system under constitutional democracy.
ii  (CritiCal) legal realism
Legal realism, and its later manifestation as critical legal realism, encom-
passes two overlapping critiques of law. An ‘internal’ critique considers legal 
doctrine and attempts to expose the contradictions inherent within (liberal) 
legal thought. Here the focus is on legal method/adjudication, as well as on 
the false distinctions between public and private law. The ‘external’ critique 
considers the place of law in politics and society, linked to a wider political 
project of societal transformation.11
Legal realism was predominantly a challenge to formalism, to the idea that 
the legal process involves the mechanical application of rules, that judges 
all probability not anticipated or appreciated, which work hardship or injustice, ie. to matters which 
Parliament might presumably want to rectify. It is a very different thing, and in my view a very 
improper one, for a judge to rush into a political storm or into the wake of it, in a strongly contested 
matter in which Parliament has, by way of firm deliberate policy, knowing what it is about and in 
the valid exercise of its legislative powers, laid down what is to be done. In such a matter, it is not 
our function to write an indignant codicil to the will of Parliament’ (ibid 7).
10 Although we do not discuss this in our article, the development of customary law would also be 
subject to value-based development.
11 On this distinction, see WB le Roux & K van Marle ‘Critical Legal Studies’ in C Roederer & D 
Moellendorf Jurisprudence (2004) chapter 10.
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decide cases ‘on the basis of distinctly legal rules and reasons that justify a 
unique result’,12 and that law and rights are discovered, not made.
The realist challenge to the formalist faith in the objective existence of 
‘rights’ was based upon an examination of key legal categories in order to 
reveal their inherent incoherence. Realism also targeted the idea of a clear 
division in law between the public and private sphere. Thus, realists argued 
that rights are not a pre-existing fact of nature to be found ‘out there’, but are a 
function of the decision-making process itself. For a realist, what a court cites 
as the justification for the decision, being the existence of a right, only serves 
to describe the result of the case. Rights are then seen as an artificial function 
of the very decision-making process itself as opposed to a reflection of an 
objective reality. As such, rights are inherently political, regardless of their 
source in legislation or judgments, and express a particular set of preferences 
and interests. As Elizabeth Mensch writes:
Realism had effectively undermined the fundamental premises of legal liberalism, particu-
larly the crucial distinction between legislation (subjective exercise of will) and adjudication 
(objective exercise of reason). Inescapably, it had also suggested that the whole liberal world 
view of (private) rights and (public) sovereignty mediated by the rule of law was only a 
mirage, a pretty fantasy that masked the reality of economic and political power.13
This is particularly well illustrated by the realist critique of private law. 
Robert Hale, for example, argued that state enforcement of a contract rep-
resented, in a similar fashion to property, a delegation of a sovereign power 
of the state. Coercion was central ‘to every freely’ chosen exchange, in that 
it was a coercive power that was inherent in each person’s legally protected 
threat to withhold what is owned; the right to withhold created the right to 
force submission to one’s own terms. On this line of argument, there was 
no inner core of a free, autonomous bargaining process to be protected from 
extraneous state action. The coercion of the state was inextricably linked to 
the nature of the contractual relationship;14 in that the latter depended upon 
the former. Realists also launched a sustained attack on the legitimacy of the 
market, emphasising that the market, and the law which underpinned it, was 
neither natural nor neutral but rather a social construct which could only be 
judged in terms of its social consequences. Morton Horwitz writes thus:
A picture of a decentralised, comprehensive and self regulating market lay at the core of 
efforts to define the public–private distinction. Just as the analogist division between public 
and private law presupposed that voluntary relations of market exchange would usually make 
coercive regulatory interventions unnecessary, the more general separation of activities into 
public and private spheres was also driven by a conception of a neutral, a political and above 
all self regulating economic realm.15
12 S Hoctor ‘Legal Realism’ in Roederer & Moellendorff ibid 158, 158. See also E Mensch ‘The 
History of Mainstream Legal Thought’ in D Kairys (ed) The Politics of Law; a Progressive Critique 
3 ed (1998).
13 Mensch ibid 35.
14 See R Hale ‘Bargaining Duress and Economic Liberty’ (1943) 43 Columbia LR 603. 
15 M Horwitz The Transformation of American Law 1870 – 1960 (1992) 206.
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In reviewing the importance of the realist school of jurisprudence, Horwitz 
claims that ‘[t]he most important legacy of Realism was its challenge to the 
orthodox claim that legal thought was separate and autonomous from moral 
and political discourse’.16
Critical realists, drawing on a range of left thinking from Marx to Marcuse, 
built upon realist foundations. Examining legal doctrine in a number of legal 
fields, sourced both in public and private law, they exposed the liberal myth of 
the neutrality of law, illustrating how the underlying norms and values of legal 
system are inherently contested, requiring those who seek to change the law 
to engage the form, content and application of these values.17 Critical realists 
thus reject the idea of universal values, or principles that are immanent within 
law, as well as any notion of legal neutrality. It is here that the divide between 
critical realists and Dugard becomes apparent for Dugard placed more faith 
in liberal values and in the possibility of neutrality of legal principle which 
comported with a universal narrative of the intrinsic nature and quality of law.
In general, the insistence on law as imbued with power meant that it could 
never be viewed as neutral because it always sustained particular interests. As 
an internal critique of law, critical realism mandates a close engagement with 
all legal doctrine and forms of adjudication to reveal the norms and interests 
that lie hidden beneath, especially in relation to private power. As an external 
critique, critical legal realism reminds us of the relationship between law and 
politics, and that law is often (to use Rick Abel’s phrase) ‘politics by other 
means’. Critical realism suggests that law does not stand outside of society or 
politics and that law and politics are always inter-related. While courts pro-
vide a forum for claiming rights and resolving disputes, and in some instances 
are effective in securing rights for the powerless – they are neither free nor 
immune from politics. This raises important questions about the nature and 
place of law in society, the extent to which it can be used to resolve political, 
economic or social disputes, and the way and extent to which law – or the rule 
of law – acts as a constraint on politics/political struggles.
For progressive lawyers who seek to use the law in challenging the status 
quo, critical realism suggests that a strategic engagement with law requires (1) 
recognition of the politics of law within both public and private spheres; and 
(2) the need to engage both rules and the underlying values/norms/assump-
tions (which might be hidden or visible) to change/subvert/dislodge the rule. 
As discussed above, this has particular implications for how we understand 
the ‘transformation’ of the legal system in post-apartheid South Africa.
Below, we explore the extent to which the implications of critical legal real-
ism were taken up under apartheid and democracy.
16 Horwitz ibid 199–200.
17 This is comprehensively set out inThe Politics of Law, edited by Kairys (note 12 above), which 
ran into three editions and covered a range of law, from family law to contract, delict, labour law, 
property law and most components of what was traditionally classified as public law.
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iii  law under apartheid
For Dugard, realism exposed the creative nature of judicial law-making in the 
public sphere, revealing the executive bias of judges drawn from a small white 
elite and conservative in their loyalty to the status quo.18
External critiques of law as reflective of a dominant political ideology 
followed upon the work of Dugard. The assumption that judges operated in 
conditions which were relatively free of restrictions placed upon them in their 
performance of their role as an arm of state and that, as an ‘independent insti-
tution’ they did not represent an important legitimating mechanism for the 
values of the ruling elite, was subjected to vigorous examination by a number of 
commentators.19 But beyond Dugard’s work in demonstrating a judicial bias in 
favour of apartheid laws, which his use of realism enabled, an internal critique 
of law that exposed the political nature of all law, both public and private, was 
generally absent. The only major contribution that interrogated the way the 
judiciary mounted a political project to shape private law, in particular, was the 
magisterial analysis by Edwin Cameron of the role of Chief Justice LC Steyn, 
although even here there was no apparent recourse to realist theory.20
Notwithstanding its far reaching implications for a progressive jurisprudence 
in the public and private domains, realism scarcely made an impact within the 
legal academy21 and even less was its effect within the practising profession. The 
dearth of academic and strategic practical thinking about the implications of 
Dugard’s insights on legal formalism meant that academics and litigators tended 
to work within the parameters of formalism, rather than seeking to challenge 
and subvert it. In turn, this was shaped by the nature of law and politics at the 
time, which offered limited opportunities for legal manoeuvre.
Dugard’s use of natural law, however, was adopted by scholars who fol-
lowed upon him in the academy. Most eminent were Ettienne Mureinik and 
David Dyzenhaus who, following the work of Ronald Dworkin, argued that 
law, properly so called, contains certain universal features. Thus, for example, 
Dyzenhaus argued, that in contrast to legal positivists, even Parliament was ‘a 
judicial body which controls the political sovereign’s will by seeing to it that 
his commands are in accordance with the law, which is assumed, to be the 
overarching natural law expressive of a Divine Will’.22 Thus, by following the 
18 Dugard (note 5 above) 380.
19 See, for example, E Cameron ‘Legal Chauvinism, Executive-Mindedness and Justice – LC Steyn’s 
Contribution Impact on South African Law’ (1982) 99 SALJ 38; H Corder & D Davis ‘Law and 
Social Practice: An Introduction’ in H Corder (ed) Essays in Law and Social Practice (1998) chap-
ter 1; R Suttner ‘The Ideological Role of the Judiciary in South Africa’ (1984) 13 Philosophical 
Papers 28.
20 Cameron ibid.
21 On the other hand, Dugard’s criticism of positivism generated a heated academic debate. See C 
Forsyth & J Schiller ‘The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty II’ (1981) 98 SALJ 218; J 
Dugard ‘Some Realism about the Judicial Process and Positivism – A Reply’ (1981) 98 SALJ 372; D 
Dyzenhaus ‘Positivism and Validity’ (1983) 100 SALJ 454; DM Davis ‘Positivism and the Judicial 
Function’ (1985) 102 SALJ 103.
22 D Dyzenhaus Hard Cases In Wicked Legal Systems; South African Law In Perspective Of Legal 
Philosophy (1991) 263. See also E Mureinik ‘Dworkin and Apartheid’ in Corder (note 19 above). 
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principles of the common law – fairness, reasonableness and equality – the 
legislature would be promoting the immanent qualities of law as would judges 
when they sought to interpret legislation in accordance with these principles.
In his book, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems, Dyzenhaus classified 
South African judges into plain fact and common law adjudicators. The 
majority of the judiciary throughout the apartheid period were plain fact 
judges who were committed to the primacy of the sovereign. In this the South 
African plain fact judge drew his intellectual justification from positivism for 
as Dyzenhaus observed:
[i]f the positivists aim to persuade judges who adopt a distinction between law as it is and law 
as it ought to be not to ‘focus’ on the ‘facts’ on which plain fact approach fastens, they owe 
such judges a doctrine of judicial responsibility which will show that other considerations are 
legally compelling. But positivists are especially disabled from offering such a doctrine since 
the conception of law which they share with plain fact judges is supported by the Hobbesian 
ideal which squeezes out any space for discretion.23
Thus, following Dugard, Dyzenhaus located the almost slavish deference 
of the majority of the judiciary to the authoritarian and racist legislature in 
the pervasive influence of legal positivism. A minority of judges followed 
a common law approach thereby understanding that the common law was 
not merely a set of rules but of ‘controlling principles that both explain and 
justify the explicit law and that make up the context in which judges must 
try to interpret the data relevant to the question raised by the case’.24
This body of work played an important, if implicit, role in legal struggles 
particularly during the 1980s. In the absence of justiciable rights and substan-
tive powers of review, legal struggles against apartheid tended to focus on 
statutory interpretation and administrative review. The dominant strategies 
adopted in courts were designed to lay claim to those core legal values, which 
Dugard had suggested were immanent within the South African legal sys-
tem. In this way, a reluctant judiciary could be persuaded that, in the case of 
ambiguity of legislation, recourse to liberal legal values could be applied to 
mitigate the draconian effects of apartheid legislation.
That strategy depended ultimately on the claim that law was neutral, that 
these values were not of a political nature, but lay at the heart of the South 
African legal system, shaped as it was by liberal principles of the Roman-
Dutch common law. It further depended on the idea that judges performed a 
neutral, adjudicative activity when they applied these principles. This strate-
gic approach was far removed from the realist imperative of deconstruction of 
neutral legal rules as outlined in this article.
Of course, legal struggles against apartheid largely focused on the 
interpretation of apartheid legislation within the wider political struggle 
for democracy. In such an intensely political context, the progressive legal 
strategy was carefully calibrated. Whether by accident or design, a call to 
values under a neutral system was an effective strategy. The dominant South 
23 Dyzenhaus ibid 246–7.
24 Dyzenhaus ibid 62.
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African legal culture based upon formalism provided opportunities for litiga-
tors to win legal victories against the state. By way of recourse to a formalist 
legal model and a literal approach to legal materials, anti-apartheid lawyers 
sought to persuade the judiciary toward results, which would have the effect 
of ‘delaying and perhaps frustrating an executive bent upon change’. The law-
yers understood that a strategy of interpretation, which was more sensitive to 
giving effect to the purpose of policy of legislation ultimately ‘was one that 
facilitated executive ambitions’.25
When anti-apartheid lawyers failed to persuade the courts of the weight of 
these arguments, judges freed themselves of the grip of literalism and engaged 
with increasing generosity towards the intentions of the legislature. The results 
were then represented by an enthusiastic embrace of racist legislation as well 
as legislation designed to promote the security concerns of the state.26 Holmes 
JA’s disgraceful dictum in Lockhart is perniciously illustrative:
The Group Areas Act; represent a colossal social experiment and a long term policy. It 
necessarily involves the movement out of Group Areas of numbers of people throughout 
the country. Parliament must have envisaged that compulsory population shifts of persons 
occupying certain areas would inevitably cause disruption and, within the foreseeable future, 
substantial inequalities. Whether all this will ultimately prove to be for the common weal of 
all the inhabitants, is not for the Court to decide. But in that connection reference might per-
haps be made to the Group Areas Development Act, 69 of 1955, sec. 12 of which empowers 
the Board to develop group areas and to assist persons to acquire or hire immovable property 
in such areas. The question before this Court is the purely legal one whether this piece of 
legislation impliedly authorises, towards the attainment of its goal, the more immediate and 
foreseeable discriminatory results complained of in this case. In my view, for the reason 
which I have given, it manifestly does.27
By contrast, where lawyers were able to persuade the court towards a literal 
interpretation buttressed, on occasion, by recourse to so-called ‘neutral values’ 
which were embedded in the legal system, surprising results ensued which 
helped to curb the excesses of the apartheid regime. This was luminously evi-
dent, for example in the two key challenges against the pass laws, the cases of 
Komani and Rikhoto.28 These cases did not sweep away the efforts of imposed 
segregation, poverty, unemployment, lack of education and housing, but two 
central pillars of influx control policy were demolished: wives could now stay 
in urban areas with their husbands who enjoyed rights of residence and work-
ers who, were in substance, employed in urban areas could now win rights of 
25 M Chanock The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902–1936: Fear, Favour and Prejudice 
(2001) 518. 
26 See in this connection Minister of Interior v Lockhart 1961 (2) SA 587 (A); Rossouw v Sachs 1964 
(2) SA 551 (A). See also Omar v Min of Law and Order 1987 (3) SA 859 (A); Staatspresident v 
UDF 1988 (4) SA 830 (A); Staatspresident v Release Mandela Campaign 1988 (4) SA 903 (A). For 
a discussion of these emergency cases, see N Haysom & C Plaskett ‘The War against Law: Judicial 
Activism and the Appellate Division’ (1988) 4 SAJHR 303.
27 Ibid 602 D-G.
28 Komani No v Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Peninsula Area 1980 (4) SA 448 (A); Oos 
Randse Administrasie Raad v Rokhoto 1983 (3) SA 595 (A). Both of these cases are carefully 
analysed in Richard Abel’s magisterial text Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle against 
Apartheid 1980–1994 (1995) chapter 3.
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permanent residence. However, such cases were few and increasingly limited 
to minority judgments.29
If progressive lawyers deliberately sought to keep politics out of law (thus 
preserving its neutrality), they did not keep politics out of the legal arena. 
On the contrary, criminal trials, for example, often provide a site of ideologi-
cal struggle in which the use of politics was carefully strategised. While the 
trial itself was usually fought on issues of proof, evidence and credibility, the 
alternative version of facts presented to the court might speak an alternative 
political truth – the liberation of South Africa from apartheid. If and when the 
stage of sentencing was reached, more evidence of the liberation struggle etc 
was introduced, both for political ends (to educate the public and supporters) 
and for legal ends (in the hope that a sympathetic judge would accept this in 
mitigation of sentence).30
There were thus manifest strategic reasons to treat the law as neutral within 
the public sphere. Recourse to the political implications of critical realism was 
hardly conducive to persuading a recalcitrant judiciary to gainsay repressive 
legislation; Dworkin was a far more strategically useful litigation ally then 
Llewellyn or even Duncan Kennedy!
But it would be wrong to view the approaches of progressive litigators 
purely in terms of a pragmatic recourse to liberal legal theory. As noted, an 
external critique of law which operated in parallel to the liberal critique of 
apartheid law was generated by academics and legal activists schooled in 
Marxism and more radical studies. For these progressive lawyers and academ-
ics, the ideas of British historian, EP Thompson, and his image of standing 
on ‘a very narrow ledge’31 between liberalism and Marxism had particular 
resonance. Thompson’s research on the rule of law in 18th century England 
led him to conclude that law was, on the one hand, class-bound and served 
to reproduce, both instrumentally and ideologically, particular class interests 
and power, but in doing so it imposed inhibitions on the actions of the rulers 
and even resulted in government defeats in court. For Thompson, ‘the regula-
tion and the reconciliation of conflict through the rule of law [wa]s a cultural 
achievement of universal significance’.32 In South Africa, although law under 
apartheid manifestly served the race and class based interest of the rulers, the 
possibility that the rule of law, however weak the adherence thereto in South 
Africa, could impose effective inhibitions upon power and hence bolster the 
defence of the citizen from arbitrary power afforded some protection particu-
larly to the powerless.33
29 Arguably the most important minority judgment was that of Friedman J (as he then was) in Minister 
of Law and Order v Omar 1986 (3) SA 306 (C). See also Van Heerden JA in Staatspresident v 
United Democratic Front (note 26 above). 
30 One outstanding exception to this is the case of the ‘Delmas Four’ portrayed in Peter Harris’ book In 
A Different Time (2008). See also C Albertyn ‘A Critical Analysis of Political Trials in South Africa: 
1948–1988’ unpublished PhD thesis, Cambridge University (1992).
31 EP Thompson Whigs and Hunters (1975) 260.
32 Ibid 265.
33 Ibid 266.
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It was, inter alia, the belief – from both a liberal and more radical perspective 
– that law, to a greater or lesser extent, enabled challenges to power, coupled 
with the emergence of public interest centres such as the Centre for Applied 
Legal Studies and the Legal Resources Centre, that enabled the ‘explosion’ 
of legal struggles in the 1980s. Dugard’s role in this was pivotal in that his 
leadership allowed lawyers who embraced the position best encapsulated by 
the work of EP Thompson, such as Halton Cheadle and Nicholas Haysom, 
to flourish and develop a range of strategic legal challenges to the apartheid 
regime. These were particularly successful in the area of labour law,34 and in 
holding the state to account over assaults in detention.35
Under apartheid, law continued to offer a range of spaces for challeng-
ing the state and for advancing the struggle for democracy, Often defensive, 
rather than proactive – and sometimes ideological rather than real – these 
legal struggles also kept alive an idea so central to Dugard’s thinking – that 
law could serve justice. The success of the strategy is summarised by Abel in 
his review of the legal struggles of the 1980s:
The legal battles described in this book did not win the war by themselves. But they empow-
ered the masses while offering some protection from state retaliation. They strengthened 
the commitment of the anti-apartheid movement to legality – and also, perhaps that of the 
post-apartheid policy.36
The same strategic considerations did not inevitably apply to private law 
which was not subjected to the same searching external critique as public law. 
Private law continued to illustrate the endemic nature of formalism within 
the legal system. Legal formalism sought to separate the legal from the politi-
cal, both institutionally and in terms of a justification for legal adjudication. 
As Zimmerman and Visser noted, lawyers in South Africa ‘tend to create 
law primarily with reference to the intellectual concerns raised in statutory 
documents, authoritative court decisions and learned treatises’.37 The classic 
remark of Kessler was hardly likely to produce a positive judicial reaction 
among judges manning the apartheid ramparts:
[A]pparently the realization of deep going antinomies in the structure of our system of con-
tracts is too painful an experience to be permitted to rise to the full level of our consciousness.38
Family law is illustrative of this approach, particularly the extent of discrimi-
nation and stereotyping which saturated the common law. Thus, it was only 
34 For an analysis of labour litigation during the 1980s, see C Thompson ‘Trade Unions using the Law’ 
in Corder (note 19 above). 
35 For example, the application brought by Wendy Orr against the state to prevent the torture of 
detainees in the Eastern Cape. See Abel (note 28 above) and D Davis & M le Roux Precedent 
& Possibility: the (ab)use of Law in South Africa (2009) for discussions of this case. See also 
the creative use of the Anton Pillar order to search and seize instruments of torture at a police 
station discussed in C Plasket ‘Anton Pillar Orders and Police Stations (Ex Parte Mashini EPD 19 
December 1985 Case No 2000/85, unreported)’ (1986) 2 SAJHR 67. 
36 Abel (note 28 above) 549.
37 R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa 
(1996) 6. See also K Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitution’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 168.
38 F Kessler ‘Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’ 1943 (4) Columbia 
LR 629, 633.
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in 1993 that legislation repealed the common law rule that gave the husband 
marital power ‘over the person and property of his wife’ and abolished any 
marital power that a husband may have had immediately prior to the coming 
into operation of the Act which repealed the common law provision.39 Similarly, 
it took until 1993 for legislation to abolish the marital rape exemption, which 
provided that a husband could not be convicted of the rape of his wife.
In summary, progressive legal strategies during the late 70s and 80s 
extracted some victories from a brutal regime, but the strategies employed 
were hardly conducive to theoretical developments of law along the lines of 
the internal realist critique, the absence of which, we argue, has negatively 
affected the development of law. Whereas the theoretical debates developed 
during the apartheid years had created a sophisticated external critique of law, 
the use of a liberal legal discourse to claw legal victories from a recalcitrant 
state simultaneously had reinforced legal formalism. Consequently there was 
a marked absence of engagement with the conceptual or ideological underpin-
nings of legal doctrine at the very moment that the Constitution demanded the 
transformation of the entire legal system.
To anticipate the argument, the challenge to transform the legal system 
after 1994 required a sustained internal critique of all existing rules within 
the South African legal system in order to commence the further work of 
development of the existing system in the image of the principles contained 
within the Constitution. It is to this issue that we now turn.
iv  the dawn of demoCraCy
Political negotiations in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(Codesa) and the Multi-Party Talks, and later the Constitutional Assembly, 
saw the emergence of a democratic South African Constitution40 in which the 
familiar features of liberal democracy existed alongside a more substantive 
commitment to socio-economic rights and social justice. Of this Constitution, 
Chanock notes wryly that:
[a] form of liberalism, which has failed over the whole period of the South African state to 
attract significant support from any segment of the population, found its political philosophy 
entrenched in the heart of a new Constitution.41
The Constitution’s foundational principles of human dignity, equality and 
freedom,42 its justiable Bill of Rights and its strong commitment to an inde-
pendent judiciary and the rule of law constituted important antidotes to an 
39 The General Law Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993. See J Sinclair The Law of Marriage (1996) 
129.
40 Act 200 of 1993 (the interim Constitution) Act 108 of 1996.
41 M Chanock ‘A Post-Calvinist Catechism or a Post-Communist Manifesto? Intersecting Narratives 
in the South African Bill of Rights Debate’ in P Alston (ed) Promoting Human Rights Through Bill 
of Rights Comparative Perspectives (1999) chapter 10, 392–3.
42 Dignity was not afforded a prominent textual position in the interim Constitution (note 1 above), 
which spoke of ‘equality, freedom … ’, but was fully recognised in its jurisprudence (S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC)). It was included in the trio of foundational values in the final 
Constitution.
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unjust past in which law had been abused for the power and interests of a 
white minority. Dugard had realised this in 1977 when he noted that a Bill 
of Rights would enable a post-apartheid government to restore respect for 
the law and legal institutions in circumstances where these had been used as 
instruments of oppression.43 In the 1990s, many human rights lawyers and 
academics welcomed the liberal values of the new Constitution, some seeing 
these as part of a universal narrative and the institutionalisation of individual 
liberties and values that, as Dugard had argued, had always been immanent 
in our legal system.44 By contrast, realism – for which Dugard had advocated 
so strongly in the 1970s – suggests a more contingent and contested approach 
to the Constitution, its liberal democratic form and its substantive content. It 
is an approach that has remained undeveloped in South African jurisprudence 
and academia. We argue that it remains a significant legacy of Dugard’s work 
in the post-apartheid era and explore some of its implications below.
In this section, we focus on two areas of critical legal realism: legal method 
and adjudication, and the political and contested nature of law. Firstly, we 
briefly consider the importance of critical legal realism to constitutional 
adjudication, especially in relation to private law. Secondly, we consider the 
Constitution as a contested document, with a number of competing interpreta-
tions of its provisions, and thus of its reach and its impact on our democracy 
and society. We explore the uncertain nature of its transformative potential in 
relation to these contested interpretations and explore the ‘answers’ that might 
be suggested by a critical legal realist approach.
(a)  Critical realism, contestation and transformation
The establishment of constitutional democracy placed the Bill of Rights at the 
centre of legal and political power in South Africa. According to s 7(1) of the 
Constitution, it is the ‘cornerstone of democracy’ in South Africa, enshrines 
the rights of all people and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom. As the supreme law and the grundnorm against which 
all law and conduct would be measured,45 the Constitution represented a 
political and legal sea change from the past. Its provisions enjoined the legal 
community to transform the very core of the apartheid legal system. Both 
public and private power – statutory, common and customary law – were 
subject to its provisions. Thus s 8 states that the Constitution binds all public 
actors, applies to all law and binds private actors under certain circumstances. 
Section 39(1)(a) requires a court, tribunal or forum to promote the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom when interpreting the Bill of Rights, and s 39(2) provides further that 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
43 Dugard (note 5 above). 
44 Mureinik (note 22 above); D Meyerson Rights Unlimited (1997).
45 Section 2 of the Constitution.
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the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law.
Early in the creation of its constitutional jurisprudence, the Constitutional 
Court recognised the transformative challenge posed by the Constitution. 
Mohamed DP (as he then was) proclaimed in the Court’s first case, S v 
Makwanyane:46
The South African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is defensible 
and represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of, that part of the past which is 
disgracefully racist authoritarian, insular repressive and a vigorous identification of a com-
mitment to a democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos, expressly 
articulated in the Constitution … What the Constitution expressly aspires to do is to provide 
a transition from those grossly unacceptable features of the past to a conspicuously contrast-
ing ‘future founded on a recognition of human rights; democracy and peaceful coexistence 
and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, 
belief or sex’.
The Constitutional Court has consistently endorsed the Constitution’s place 
within a broader transformative project:
Both the Constitutional Court and other courts view the Constitution as transformative. The 
previous Chief Justice has written that a ‘commitment … to transform our society … lies 
at the heart of the new constitutional order’. It is clear that the notion of transformation has 
played and will play a vital role in interpreting the Constitution.47
Yet, as has become clear over the past 15 years, the nature and scope of this 
transformation is by no means uncontested. While there might be a rhetorical 
consensus on the idea of transformation, its constitutional meaning, content 
and effects have been contested in the Court’s jurisprudence, within academia 
and more broadly within politics. This contestation is particularly visible 
where the text seems to nudge the Constitution beyond the traditional bounda-
ries of liberal democracy. It includes the extent to which the Constitution 
governs private power and the common law;48 the interpretation and applica-
tion of socio-economic rights;49 the role and capacity of courts in addressing 
the structural inequalities of our society, including economic redistribution;50 
46 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 262.
47 P Langa ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Univ LR 351.
48 For differing views see for example, D Bhana ‘The Law of Contract and the Constitution: Napier v 
Barkhuizen’ (2007) 124 SALJ 269; D Bhana & M Pieterse ‘Towards A Reconciliation of Contract 
Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited’ (2005) 122 SALJ 865; A Fagan ‘The 
Confusion of K’ (2009) 126 SALJ 156.
49 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007); K McLean Constitutional Deference, Courts 
and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2009); S Liebenberg Socio Economic Rights under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010).
50 C Albertyn ‘Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 253; E 
Bonthuys ‘Institutional Openness and Resistance to Feminist Arguments: The Example of the South 
African Constitutional Court’ (2008) 20 Canadian J of Women and the Law 1; B Goldblatt & S 
Liebenberg ‘Achieving Substantive Equality in South Africa: The Relationship between Equality 
and Socio-Economic Rights’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 335; H Botha ‘Equality, Plurality and Structural 
Power’ (2009) 25 SAJHR 1.
200 (2010) 26 SAJHR
SAJHR_2010_2-Text.indd   200 2011/04/08   11:26 AM
and the proper relationship between courts and other state institutions in adju-
dicating rights (remedial and separation of powers issues).51
This contestation partly emerges (directly or indirectly) from different 
understandings of the role and content of the Constitution’s underlying nor-
mative system. It thus relates to different legal methods (largely represented 
by formalism or realism) and different interpretations of constitutional values.
As stated by the Constitutional Court in Carmichele v Minister for Safety 
and Security:52 ‘Our constitution is not merely a formal document regulating 
public power. It also embodies, like the German constitution an objective, 
normative value system’.53 While we can all agree that the Constitution was 
designed to enable and support a democratic society, we might disagree on the 
content and prioritisation of its values thus giving rise to different ideas about 
the nature of our democracy and the change that is required to attain a more 
just society. For example, an egalitarian approach might emphasise a society 
committed to social justice and self realisation, entailing profound socio-
economic redistribution and change, while a more liberty-based approach 
might be more concerned with protecting individual freedoms against state 
incursion, placing brakes on the state’s capacity for remedial action.54 This 
also entails different views of the reach of the Constitution. While a more 
egalitarian perspective would support greater constitutional scrutiny of pri-
vate power, a stronger reliance on liberty would draw a bright line between 
the private sphere and public scrutiny.
Of course, one could argue that this contestation is misplaced – that the 
Constitution’s normative value system speaks to a set of universal values that 
prescribe limited answers. These are also the values that, in Dugard’s critique 
of the apartheid legal order, were immanent in our legal heritage and common 
law. Following a Dworkinian approach, implicit in Dugard’s work, and explicit 
in the work of writers such as Dyzenhaus and Mureinik, contemporary liberal 
academics suggest that the constitutional value system contains universal 
liberal principles that shape a ‘correct’ answer to a legal problem.55 While 
pragmatic concerns might influence a judicial decision, a single, principled, 
reasoned decision based on the Constitution’s liberal value system is possible 
and desirable. An eloquent example of this approach is to be found in a cri-
tique of the critical realist approach by Theunis Roux.56 In criticising Klare’s 
adoption of the critical method to the South African Constitution, Roux con-
tends that by contrast to implementing a transformative constitutional project, 
Dworkin’s Hercules would find the best interpretation of the Bill of Rights 
51 McLean (note 48 above); K Hofmeyr ’A Central Case Analysis of Constitutional Remedial Power’ 
(2008) 125 SALJ 521. 
52 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). 
53 Ibid para 54.
54 We discuss some of these approaches in more detail below. See text accompanying footnotes 
90-103.
55 Mureinik (note 22 above); Dyzenhaus (note 22 above); Meyerson (note 44 above).
56 T Roux ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the best Interpretation of the South African 
Constitution: Distinction without a Difference’ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch Univ LR 258.
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by devising, a progressive political theory along Rawlsian Iines to support 
this ‘best based’ interpretation. The distinction between Roux’s indigenous 
Hercules and Klare’s critical judge does not rest on the classification of the 
interpretative task, but on an acceptance or denial that adjudication based on 
a text depends on divining a universal narrative, which claim to ‘truth’ trumps 
all other interpretative offerings, no matter the political, social, economical or 
ideological context in which the adjudication takes place.
A critical realist approach, steeped in the close relationship between law 
and politics and a more contingent approach to law and values, admits to a 
more uncertain outcome. Although the text places some constraints on inter-
pretation, the values and principles of the Constitution, viewed through a 
judge’s particular political preferences, can give rise to divergent responses. 
Constitutional adjudication thus requires a legal method that enables judges 
to define the particular vision enshrined in the Constitution’s normative value 
system, and to interpret its provisions through an explicit engagement with 
its values. In so far as there are competing interpretations, the act of choosing 
one over another is a political one that has implications for how we understand 
the transformation of legal system – and thus of society.
The Constitution’s transformative purpose, as well as the centrality of its 
values demonstrated in ss 7(1), 39(1) and 39(2), constitute an invitation for 
a realist critique and realist methods to be introduced into the adjudicative 
process. The starting point for this is to identify the Constitution’s norma-
tive vision. In our view, the best interpretation of the Constitution and its 
transformative impulse is an egalitarian one. This requires, inter alia, the 
achievement of socio-economic equality and individual well-being through 
the dismantling of structures of exclusion and oppression and the develop-
ment of a caring and inclusive society.57 Legal transformation should thus 
be directed at the eradication, inter alia, of past racist and sexist practices 
that were deemed to be in conflict with this new normative conception of 
justice, together with the development of principles which would in turn 
serve as a guide to58 the atonement of the egalitarian society prefigured in the 
Constitution.59
This requires legal interpreters to engage in a process of deconstruction of 
the values which were embedded in the legal system inherited from apartheid. 
The challenge is to understand that the previous legal system, even when 
purged of apartheid, racism and sexism, may not have constituted a suffi-
cient basis on which to ground a transformed society because the value-laden 
qualities of those laws remained in conflict with a new conception of justice. 
It also requires a substantive engagement with values in the process of legal 
reasoning.
57 See Klare (note 37 above). 
58 See T Roux ‘Continuity and Change in a Transforming Legal Order: The Impact of Section 26(3) of 
the Constitution of South African Law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 466, 467.
59 See Klare (note 37 above) 151–6.
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Embracing the methods of critical legal realism60 is a challenge within a 
legal community steeped in formalism. As other writers have pointed out, the 
courts’ ability to overcome the limits of legal formalism, to develop a more 
detailed and conscious understanding of constitutional principles and values 
in interpreting the Constitution, and to engage in ‘substantive legal reason-
ing’ has been limited.61 We illustrate this briefly in relation to the ambivalent 
approach to the common law.
In his 1971 article, John Dugard proclaimed the liberal roots of the common 
law sourced in the Roman-Dutch tradition. It is important to note that Dugard 
was not concerned with private law, based on the common law but rather to 
divine ‘obvious guiding principles’ from Roman-Dutch law, principles such 
as freedom from arbitrary arrest, prohibition against cruel and inhuman pun-
ishment, equality before the law, freedom of assembly and movement, all of 
which principles were eroded by legislation passed by the apartheid govern-
ment.62 Within the constitutional context, we are concerned with something 
different: Common law as it anchors private law.
(b)  Transformation and jurisprudence in private law
As discussed in part II above, realism was particularly concerned with the way 
in which political and economic power was sustained in and through private 
law. A deep legacy of colonialism, segregation and apartheid in South Africa 
meant that, although political power shifted to the former national liberation 
movement, the African National Congress (ANC), social and economic power 
remained predominantly in white hands. Hence there was a strong political 
impetus to ensure that the Constitution could address social and economic 
inequalities in the private sphere. The Court had interpreted the interim 
Constitution to limit it application to the private sphere (and to exclude the 
possibility of direct horizontal application).63 As a result, the provisions of the 
1996 Constitution were explicit on its application to private parties and the 
common law.64
However, judges and legal scholars have remained ambivalent about the 
Constitution’s reach in respect of the common law. This is illustrated by Anton 
Fagan’s recent critique65 of the Constitutional Court’s decision in K v Minister 
of Safety and Security,66 and by the courts’ approach to the law of contract.
60 We do not have the space to set these out in detail, nor is this the purpose of this article. For a 
detailed exposition of the application of the methods of legal realism in South Africa, see D Davis 
& K Klare ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law’ (2010) 26 
SAJHR forthcoming.
61 See, for example, A Cockrell ‘Rainbow Jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 1; Roux (note 56 above); 
S Woolman ‘The Amazing Vanishing Bill of Rights’ (2007) 124 SALJ 762. 
62 Dugard (note 1 above) 197.
63 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC).
64 Section 8(3) explicitly states that the Constitution is applicable to private persons, thus overturning 
the decision of Du Plessis ibid. 
65 Fagan (note 48 above).
66 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC).
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The crisp question for decision in K was whether the Minister of Safety and 
Security was vicariously liable for rapes which had been committed upon Ms 
K by three policemen who were on duty at the time. Whereas the Supreme 
Court of Appeal decided that there was no vicarious liability, the, Constitution 
Court differed. In essence, the Court found that even if an employee’s inten-
tion in committing a delict was to promote his own interest, if the act was 
sufficiently closely connected to his employment, it could be held that the 
employee had acted in the course and scope of employment which would jus-
tify the finding of the imposition of liability on the employer.67
Fagan’s disagreement with the substance of a decision on vicarious liability 
is not the direct concern of this article, save for his examination of the scope of 
s 39(2) of the Constitution and its application to the development of common 
law. Fagan attacks the approach of the Constitutional Court to s 39(2), namely 
that the provision obliges a court to develop an applicable rule of common 
law insofar as it does not accord with the values of the Constitution. Adopting 
a literal interpretation to s 39(2), Fagan contends that the section does not 
impose such an obligation on a court. The wording of the section insofar as it 
is relevant, is as follows: ‘when developing the common law … every court 
…. must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’. Fagan 
argues:
it should be clear that what s 39(2) explicitly does is to impose on all courts a conditional 
obligation to promote the values of the Bill of Rights – the condition being that the court is 
developing the common law. What the Constitutional Court in K took s 39(2) to imply, how-
ever, is that every court is under a conditional obligation to develop the common law – the 
condition being that doing so would promote the values of Constitution.68
This criticism amounts to the following: the Court has inverted the wording of 
s 39(2) which imposes on obligation to promote the values of the Bill of Rights 
when the court arrives at a decision to develop the common law. The section 
was not intended to impose an obligation on courts, in every encounter with 
the common law, to interrogate an applicable rule of common law through 
the lens of the Bills of Rights and thereafter make a decision to develop the 
applicable rule of common law.
It should, however, be apparent from the exposition of realism developed in 
this article that an engagement with the literal wording of s 39(2) as the sole 
basis for its analysis ignores the nature of the adjudicative process undertaken 
in a case involving the common law. The critical question for determination 
is the existence of the trigger which propels a court to develop the common 
law. Section 39(2) employs the words ‘when a court develops the common 
law’ but the wording does not answer the question as to the condition which 
precipitates a decision to develop the common law. In the pre-constitutional 
era, a court would claim that the common law required development because 
in its present form it was incongruent with the legal convictions of the com-
67 Ibid 436 B–E; 441 G–H; 442 B–C.
68 Fagan (note 48 above) 183.
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munity, hardly a precise term. Indeed the term is no more than a rhetorical 
tool to enable a court to justify its decision-making process.69
Once the Constitution was introduced, the normative underpinnings of 
the legal system, or to employ the older terminology, the legal convictions 
of the community, are to be found in the Constitution. How then is a court to 
determine whether a principle of common law is congruent with the legal con-
victions of the community as mediated through the values of the Constitution? 
The indicated adjudicative process would appear to run as follows: A court, 
faced with a set of facts together with an argument that a rule of common law 
must be applied to these facts, engages with the application of the prevailing 
law to the facts. It finds that the result thereof is incongruent with the legal 
convictions of the community, because the applicable rule promotes a value 
system which is no longer in accordance with these legal convictions. This 
exercise depends upon an initial enquiry that is the very kind of interrogation 
of the underlying assumptions of the common law rule as was advocated by 
the realist school of jurisprudence. However, in the constitutional era it is but-
tressed by s 39(2) of the Constitution. Moseneke DCJ expressed this approach 
as follows:
It seems to me that the need to develop the common law under s 39(2) could arise in at least 
two instances. The first would be when a rule of the common law is inconsistent with a 
constitutional provision. Repugnancy of this kind would compel an adaptation of the com-
mon law to resolve the inconsistency. The second possibility arises even when a rule of the 
common law is not inconsistent with a specific constitutional provision but may fall short 
of its spirit, purport and objects. Then, the common law must be adapted so that it grows in 
harmony with the ‘objective normative value system’ found in the Constitution.70
In other words, a realist approach to the application of s 39(2) would require 
an initial process of deconstruction of the values underpinning the applicable 
existing rule of common law as essential before a decision can be taken as to 
the necessity of a development of the relevant rule to render it congruent with 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Expressed differently, a 
court, confronted with a common law rule the application of which could 
be decisive of a case, if developed, would first consider whether the existing 
rule is congruent with the spirit, purport and objects of the common law by 
analysing the values promoted by the accepted formulation of the rule. If it 
finds that these values are incompatible with the principles promoted by the 
Bill of Rights, it may then decide to develop the common law in terms of these 
principles.
69 See, for example, Marais JA in Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 (3) SA 1049 (SCA) para 
15: ‘There are many areas of the law in which Courts have to make policy choices or choices which 
entail identifying prevailing societal values and applying them. But Courts are expected to be able 
to recognise the difference between a personal and possibly idiosyncratic preference as to what 
the community’s conviction ought to be and the actually prevailing conviction of the community. 
Provided that Courts conscientiously bear the distinction in mind, little, if any, harm is likely to 
result’.
70 S v Thebus 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) para 78.
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The inability to engage in this process is revealed in a recent contribution 
to the debate about fairness in the South African law of contract.71 Mr Justice 
Brand refers to a dictum of Cameron JA in Brisley v Drotsky72 in which Judge 
Cameron found support for the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the con-
stitutional values of dignity and freedom: ‘Contractual autonomy is part of 
freedom … (and) shorn of its obscene excesses, contractual autonomy also 
informs the constitutional value of dignity’.73 Judge Cameron thus held that an 
ability to contract can enhance self-respect and dignity.
Amazingly, although he concurred with Judge Cameron in Brisley, Judge 
Brand now appears to reject this approach, suggesting that as the values of 
dignity and freedom display ‘a perplexing capacity to pull in several direc-
tions at the same time, they may accordingly fulfil very different roles’.74 Thus 
constitutional values are not needed to underpin ‘every rule of contract law’. 
We have employed the word ‘amazing’ deliberately, in that Brand’s sweeping 
rejection of the normative framework of the Constitution in shaping of the 
values which underpin the law of contract in a constitutional democracy, as 
defined by the constitutional text, is a breathtaking insistence upon the univer-
sality and absolute truth of the pre-constitutional common law. To an extent, 
this approach is predicted on the idea of a ‘brooding neutral omnipresence of 
common law’ which does not require interference from alien influences as 
the Constitution. Brand concedes that it is not irrelevant whether a contrac-
tual provision is regarded as unreasonable, whether it be a negotiated term or 
forms part of a standard form contract nor can an unequal bargaining position 
between the parties be of no concern to a court.75 But, instead of an interroga-
tion of the underlying values of the law of contract and the development of the 
law so that it is congruent with constitutional values, Brand produces what he 
considers to be a more precise resolution of these concerns: recourse to public 
policy. As he writes:
I do believe … that these and numerous other considerations can be accommodated under 
the rubric of public policy which has by now become firmly established as a mechanism of 
judicial control over contractual enforcement.76
He is forced to concede that ‘the concept of public policy needs development 
and fine-tuning’ but, for him, the advantages of the use of public policy is 
that it will allow a court ‘to provide for the changing needs and values of the 
society by incremental change without creating wholesale, legal and com-
mercial uncertainty’.77
We finally arrive at the crux of the problem. The law of contract and other 
parts of private law are to be immunised from constitutional scrutiny: legal 
71 FDJ Brand ‘The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The 
Influence of the Common Law and the Constitution’ (2009) 126 SALJ 71.
72 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
73 Ibid paras 93–4.
74 Brisley (note 72 above) 86.
75 Brand (note 71 above) 87.
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid 87–8.
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transformation stops at the door of the state. Our Constitution promotes noth-
ing more than ‘a night-watchmen’ vision of the state in which private power 
is left to its own devices and the state enters this private realm at the peril of 
the economy. But the Constitution is a transformative instrument. It requires 
an examination of the past in order to move forward into a constitutional 
future. All law requires development in accordance with this value system. 
Practically, this would not involve a change to each and every rule of pri-
vate law but, where the law requires development, so it must be developed. 
Thereafter a measure of certainty through precedent will continue to operate. 
To contend that, only by ignoring the values of the Constitution, can judges 
be left incrementally to change the law reveals two fundamental flaws, as 
viewed through the prism of realism. Firstly, the law as it presently exists is 
not neutral nor is it certain. The application of a rule to a new set of facts cre-
ates, at least in part, a new rule; a point made eloquently by Justice O’Regan 
in K.78 Secondly, in a society committed to transformation judges are required 
to ensure that change takes place, albeit within an incremental paradigm. 
By its nature the adjudicative process will continue as in the past, through 
incremental change, on a case-by-case basis but within the imperative that the 
law complies with an articulated normative vision of the legal convictions of 
a constitutional community.
In 1971 Dugard advocated for a realist approach to adjudication, especially 
in adopting a conscious approach to the form and content of the values – 
the ‘inarticulate premise’ – that underpinned judicial decisions. His insight 
remains valid today. The fact of a value-based, supreme Constitution requires 
us to employ critical legal realism to interrogate the existing body of law 
and then to ensure that such law is congruent with the underlying values 
and principles of the legal system, now found in the Bill of Rights.79 There 
are, of course, important examples of this approach in some decisions of the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, especially in cases 
concerning the development of the common law of delict to enhance the obli-
gation of the state to protect its citizens from violence.80 Yet the approach that 
is explicit in the writing of Fagan and Brand, and that seeks to immunise at 
least part of the common law from constitutional scrutiny, remains prevalent.
A critical realist approach, however, takes us one step further than Dugard’s 
1971 work. Rather than point us in the direction of ‘universal’ liberal values 
78 K (note 66 above) para 16.
79 We are aware of only two articles that have explicitly addressed the role of Critical Legal Studies 
for private law. See JW van Doren ‘Critical Legal Studies and South Africa’ (1989) 106 SALJ 648 
(arguing for the use of CLS to subvert the Roman-Dutch private law bias and formalism in SA 
law) and A van Blerk ‘Critical Legal Studies in South Africa’ (1996) 113 SALJ 86 (RDL can stifle 
transformation as it presents existing social inequalities as natural and necessary). But see Davis & 
Klare (note 60 above).
80 Carmichele (note 51 above); Minister of Safety & Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 
(SCA); Van Eeden v Min of Safety & Security 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA); Rail Commuter Action Group 
v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC), 2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC). 
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(as Dugard does in his call to ‘accepted traditional legal values’),81 it requires 
us to recognise that values are contested and that different outcomes are 
possible. Thus even where courts recognise the importance of values, they 
need to engage with them fully, and to be explicit about this process and the 
justifications for value choices. All too often, courts avoid this task.
In Barkhuizen v Napier,82 the Constitutional Court was required to deter-
mine whether a time limitation clause in a short-term insurance policy was 
constitutional. The Court concluded that this was a matter of public policy,83 
but that:
[w]hat public policy is and whether a term in a contract is contrary to public policy must now 
be determined by reference to the values that underlie our constitutional democracy as given 
expression by the provisions of the Bill of Rights.84
Despite that recognition, however, the Court failed to engage fully with the 
application of constitutional values, choosing to affirm contractual autonomy 
as a matter of freedom and dignity, and avoiding questions of equality and 
fairness in contractual bargaining.85 This reluctance suggests a concern with 
‘interfering’ with private commercial arrangements that is explicitly articu-
lated by Brand, but is strongly rejected by critical legal realists who find the 
law to be present and active in the so-called private sphere. It also represents 
an indirect value choice of autonomy over equality or equity, whereas a criti-
cal realist approach mandates a more conscious engagement with this choice 
and its implications, and would push the court in a more egalitarian direction.
To take Dugard’s call to realism seriously in the contemporary constitu-
tional era requires, firstly, a revisioning of the classic public/private divide 
to ensure that we subject our entire legal system to constitutional scrutiny. 
Secondly, that we understand and engage the contested content of values in 
line with a clear vision of the Constitution’s transformative purpose.
(c)  Critical legal realism, law and politics
Critical legal realism rejects the notion that values constitute a predetermined 
universal narrative, thus pointing to their strongly contested nature in law 
and in politics. For critical scholars, law itself is not a closed, neutral set of 
rules and principles, but is deeply political. While it is capable of regulating 
and constraining state power – especially in its liberal democratic form – it is 
also irretrievably political, imbued with unequal power relations and sectional 
81 Dugard’s adoption of a universal liberal narrative in his critique of the apartheid legal order, was 
endorsed by many of apartheid’s liberal critics. Mureinik (note 22 above); Dyzanhaus (note 22 
above). 
82 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC).
83 In doing so the Court rejected the idea that the Bill of Rights applied directly to the dispute. See 
Woolman (note 61 above).
84 Ibid para 29.
85 There is a wide literature on the failure of courts to engage constitutional values in contractual 
cases. See, for example, AJ Barnard ‘A Different Way of Saying. On Stories, Text, the Critical Legal 
Argument for Contractual Justice and the Ethical Element of Contract in South Africa’ (2005) 21 
SAJHR 278; Bhana (note 48 above); Bhana & Pieterse (note 48 above); Woolman (note 61 above).
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interests, and often seeks to legitimise the unequal distribution of power, 
goods and resources.
The political nature of law has become more explicit over the past 20 years, 
with the expansion of a rule of law standard and human rights in the wake of 
neo-liberalism and globalisation. As a result, law and courts have increasingly 
become sites of struggle over access to power, goods and resources. John and 
Jean Comaroff write compellingly of this growing ‘use of legal means for 
political and economic ends’:86
More and more are differences of all kinds being dealt with by means of law, whether they 
involve private freedoms or public resources, access to medical treatment or title to territory, 
cultural knowledge or civic authority, the physical and fiscal entitlements of rulers or the 
property, liberty and wellbeing of heir subjects, religious tolerance or ethnic aspiration … 
What once happened primarily in parliaments, street protests, and other political theatres 
now finds a new – or to be precise, a parallel, expanding – terrain of contestation.87
An understanding of the political nature of law reminds us that the achieve-
ment of a liberal democratic Constitution, with an independent judiciary, a 
justiciable Bill of Rights and commitment to the rule of law in South Africa 
was a contextual victory of liberalism and human rights at a particular historic 
moment. It emerged from a global context in which ideas of democratic lib-
eralism and human rights were dominant,88 and a national political context in 
which a commitment to rights and the rule of law came to serve the interests 
of competing parties and groups.89 Born out of struggle and compromise, the 
Constitution has always carried the burden of competing political and legal 
ideas about ‘the new South Africa’. Hence, the manner in which it is given 
texture and meaning, not only by the Constitutional Court, but also by other 
state institutions and by the people themselves, is important to shaping South 
Africa’s future and its ability to forge a new and inclusive society – one that 
breaks down, rather than re-enacts, the divisions of the past.
In this section we consider some of the wider implications of critical legal 
realism for the nature of our constitutional democracy. We note some of the 
recurring and emergent tensions within constitutional jurisprudence that rep-
resent contesting legal and political interpretations of the Constitution and 
its transformative purpose. We also discuss the extent to which these limit, 
extend or challenge the Constitution’s basic commitment to liberal democ-
racy. Alert to the realist claim that law is both uncertain and irretrievably 
connected to politics, we question the extent to which the ‘liberal consensus’ 
of the early 1990s is challenged, as well as the extent to which the Constitution 
is able to frame and nurture transformation. We conclude that transformation 
needs to be shaped by the values that were agreed upon more than a decade 
ago, but that this does not constitute an inevitable liberal narrative imposed 
86 Ethnicity, Inc. (2009) 55.
87 Ibid 55. 
88 H Klug Constituting Democracy. Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction 
(2000).
89 Chanock (note 41 above); D Davis ‘Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Argument for a Bill of 
Rights’ in P Andrews & S Ellmann The Post Apartheid Constitutions (2001); Klug ibid. 
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from above. Rather, guided by explicit judgments of the Constitutional Court, 
these values need to form the basis of deliberative discussion within society 
and the state, in order to give shape and meaning to a new, open-ended and 
shared narrative.
(i)  A contested Constitution
We have already noted the possibility of competing views of the Constitution 
and its transformational purpose. As critical realists would have us under-
stand, the abstract values and principles of the Constitution ground contesting 
and contradictory legal arguments and world-views. Constitutional interpre-
tations are not merely legal interpretations, but constitute different views of 
justice, of power and politics, of the nature, scope and pace of social and eco-
nomic change and of the role of the courts in this. We suggest that a number of 
interpretations or perspectives have been visible within academic writing and 
constitutional jurisprudence. These do not necessarily form discreet ‘models’ 
and tend either to a more egalitarian or a more libertarian view of society, or 
to a liberal democratic centre that seeks to balance the two.
We – and others90 – have argued for an egalitarian vision of the constitu-
tional project, one that is concerned with social and material inequalities in 
our society, with redress and redistribution, and our capacity to overcome 
the deep divisions of our past. Former Chief Justice, Arthur Chaskalson, 
describes these as follows:
In 1996 when the Constitutional Assembly adopted a Constitution for South Africa we were 
one of the most unequal societies in the world. We had recently emerged, almost miracu-
lously, from a repressive and undemocratic legal order, and had embraced democracy. The 
past hung over us and profoundly affected the environment in which we were living. The 
great majority of our people had been the victims of a vicious system of racial discrimination 
and repression which had affected them deeply in almost all aspects of their lives. This was 
seen most obviously in the disparities of wealth and skills between those who had benefited 
from colonial rule and apartheid and those who had not. In the contrast between those with 
land, and the millions of landless people; between those with homes and the millions without 
access to adequate housing; between those living in comfort and the millions without access 
to adequate health facilities, clean water and electricity, between those with secure occupa-
tions and the millions who were unemployed or had limited employment opportunities.91
This social-democratic or egalitarian approach seeks to expand and push 
against the boundaries of the liberal democratic framework of the Constitution. 
Accepting the fundamental importance of a substantive notion of the rule of 
law, separation of powers, an independent judiciary and justiciable rights; 
egalitarians argue strongly for an interpretation and application of socio-
90 See for example, Klare (note 37 above); C Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Facing the Challenge of 
Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality’ 
(1998) 14 SAJHR 248; D Davis ‘Adjudicating the Socio-economic Rights in the South African 
Constitution: Towards ‘deference lite’? (2006) 22 SAJHR 301; P de Vos ‘Grootboom, The Right 
of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 258; S 
Liebenberg (note 49 above).
91 ‘Equality as a Founding Value of the South African Constitution’ Oliver Schreiner lecture, 
University of the Witwatersrand (February 2001).
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economic rights and the equality right that enables meaningful standards 
for government accountability and effective remedies,92 the application of 
the Constitution to private power relations, deepening ideas of participatory 
rather than representative democracy, and promoting alternative meanings 
for the Constitution’s founding values that advance these ideas. The Court is 
enjoined to give values a specific meaning that enables effective socio-eco-
nomic transformation, rather than a more abstract content that allows judges 
to avoid difficult cases.93
A commitment to this egalitarian vision is present in many of the Court’s 
cases, especially those concerning equality and socio-economic rights and 
that emphasise the values of substantive equality, positive freedom and mate-
rial notions of dignity.94 The Court has generally endorsed the importance of 
overcoming the material inequalities of the past:
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are 
living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, 
inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate health 
services. These conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a com-
mitment to address them, and to transform our society into one in which there will be human 
dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. For as long as 
these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.95
However, the Court’s jurisprudence is not consistent in pursuing this egalitar-
ian idea, and it has been limited by more libertarian and socially conservative 
elements in the Court’s jurisprudence. This is present in a ‘negative’ sense 
in its equality jurisprudence in cases that prioritise libertarian notions of 
autonomy and choice,96 and in cases that express a strong reluctance towards 
constitutional encroachment of a ‘private sphere’.97 However, it is also present 
in a positive sense in cases that affirm individual liberties against the state.
It is, however, a liberal narrative that resonates particularly strongly within 
the Court’s jurisprudence – seeking to balance the polar tendencies of equality 
and liberty. It is present in cases that emphasise individual liberties (against 
the state), that reject status-based discrimination (and emphasise equal dignity) 
and that affirm judicial independence and the rule of law. Important here is the 
abolition of the death penalty,98 the affirmation of the rights of accused persons 
92 Bilchitz (note 49 above); Davis (note 90 above); Liebenberg (note 49 above).
93 De Vos (note 90 above); Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 90 above) (dignity and equality); Bilchitz (note 
49 above) (reasonableness).
94 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC); Khosa v Minister for Social Development 
2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC); Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR (CC) paras 72–7. On socio-economic rights, see Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).
95 Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) at 765 (CC) para 8.
96 S v Jordan 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC); Volks NO v Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC).
97 See in particular Ackermann J and Kentridge AJ in Du Plessis v De Klerk (note 63 above).
98 Makwanyane (note 46 above).
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and prisoners, and equality cases that acknowledge the equal status of outsider 
groups (gay and lesbians, non-citizens).99
There is little space to explore these issues in detail. That must remain 
another project. The simple point we wish to make is that the Constitution 
does not produce a universal narrative, but gives rise to contestation and 
difference. It is correct that the South African Constitution has signified a 
shift to individual liberties and liberal values in the public sphere (equality, 
non-racialism, individual freedoms and liberties, rule of law), and has also 
been defined by the Constitutional Court to signify a strong social democratic 
concern with addressing poverty and inequality as manifestation of dignity 
and equality. At the same time, it is increasingly clear that the hegemony 
of these interpretations is challenged within and beyond the judiciary. The 
‘middle-ground’ of liberal democracy is, and remains, a contested political 
and legal form in South Africa – both in terms of the social values it chal-
lenges through the groups it protects, as well as its core values of the rule of 
law and separation of powers.
Calls for the amendment of the Constitution, especially around issues of the 
death penalty, abortion and same sex marriage are being increasingly aired 
as socially conservative, religious communities find themselves closer to the 
centre for power.100 Equally worrying for liberal and social democrats are the 
rumblings about the nature of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence as 
‘Eurocentric’ or ‘Western’. Although little legal substance is given to these 
claims; its is clear that they represent a consensus against the more liberal 
judgements of the court (death penalty, individual liberties, same sex mar-
riage) and the courts’ remedial role in socio-economic rights cases. In some 
instances, the issue of race or identity has been directly or indirectly raised, as 
well as the Constitution’s failure to resonate with ‘Africanism’. These forms 
of opposition are often expressed in terms of alternative values, or as unar-
ticulated values of ‘the people’. Judge President, Bernard Ngoepe, expresses 
this succinctly:
Again, there are perceptions out there that, in the interpretation of the constitution, the 
courts have in some respects gone overboard. In fact, there is a saying: if anything is allowed 
anywhere in the world, it will probably be allowed in South Africa; if it is allowed in South 
Africa, it is not necessarily allowed anywhere else. 
99 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (1) BCLR 39 
(CC); Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC); 
Khosa v Minister for Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC).
100 The National Interfaith Leaders Council, headed by Pastor Ray McCauley of the conservative and 
pentecostal Rhema Church, is an indication of the growing influence of more conservative reli-
gious views. The NILC, established in July 2009, consists of over 20 senior leaders from various 
religious groups, but appears to exclude important religious forums – such as the South African 
Council of Churches (SACC), the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) or the Jewish Board of Deputies. 
According to media reports, the Council is to lead the moral regeneration debate in South Africa. L 
Peyper ‘McCauley, ANC links to morality debate’ (25 February 2010) <http://www.news24.com/
SouthAfrica/Politics/McCauley-ANC-links-to-morality-debate-20100225>.
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Again, no one is calling for a populist interpretation of the constitution, but should judges 
force things down the throat of the people in the name of the constitution, thereby running 
the risk of alienating it from the people?
 Could it be that we have, in some instances, failed to properly interpret the constitution so 
as to bring some harmony between it and the general populace?
 A natural question from the previous point is: whose values do we use as a benchmark? 
Should we go to Washington, Canada or London, and ignore as points of reference the values 
as perceived by, say, tribesmen and women in the rural areas?
 Have we or have we not given judgments which certain sections of our communities (male 
or female, black or white) have found irreconcilable with their values?101
This suggests value conflicts in the social domain, and fundamental differ-
ences amongst judges and within communities over the place and meaning 
of constitutional values. As such, it demonstrates the fact of contestation and 
the need for greater public engagement over the meaning and place of the 
transformative constitutional project, a point we return to later in the article.
Equally troubling are direct and indirect challenges to the Constitution’s 
liberal democratic form, including its commitment to the rule of law, the 
separation of powers and to accountable, responsive and open government. 
A raft of actual and potential abuses of state power are testimony to this: the 
use of state institutions for political ends102 and the failure to address corrup-
tion and hold state and political figures to account under the Constitution.103 
Although we find liberalism to be theoretically and politically ill-equipped for 
addressing the relationship between law and politics, and the contestation and 
opposition that we find in law; the liberal democratic form of the Constitution 
and its commitment to the rule of law is an indispensable constraint on the 
abuse of power and the manner in which struggles over resources and power 
are fought out.104 Defending core liberal values and the rule of law is funda-
mental to our ability to engage each other over the meaning of values and the 
trajectory of the Constitution. However, it is not enough.
(ii)  Law, politics and transformation
Liberalism is not South Africa’s universal narrative, but rather the contested 
product of a particular set of historical circumstances, one that is vulnerable 
to political and legal opposition, and that requires defence and vigilance. Most 
telling here is the warning of Chanock:
101 Sunday Times (30 August 2009).
102 For example, the apparent use of executive power to interfere with, secure or prevent prosecu-
tions. See the concerns that former president, Thabo Mbeki, was implicated in bringing corruption 
changes against President Zuma, resulting in his removal from office, as well as the calls on Mbeki 
to explain why he ‘protected’ former Commissioner of Police Jackie Selebi from corruption charges 
(‘Mbeki must explain himself on Selebi’ 4 August 2010, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/
mbeki-must-explain-himself-on-selebi-1.671978>).
103 For example, the controversial dropping of corruption charges against President Zuma in April 2009 
by the newly appointed Director of Public Prosecution, Mokotedi Mpshe. 
104 In this sense, we agree with EP Thompsons’s important insight that ‘the rule of law is a cultural 
achievement of universal significance’ (note 31 above).
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It may be that the hypothesis of rights discourses, that law can be placed beyond politics, will 
be cruelly exposed in South Africa in the coming years. But it is also likely that the alignment 
of South African law with … rights … will have significant effects on legal practice within 
the country. What is not clear is which vision of the future will benefit most from this.
 Despite the final constitutional exhortation about reconciliation, politics seems likely to 
reproduce the narratives of the years prior to reconciliation. There will be an increasing 
demand to tell more of the socialist story, and the recently submerged narratives of race and 
ethnicity will continue to be a part, officially or unofficially, of a highly racialised and ethni-
cally conscious society … However the Constitutional Court interprets the Bill of Rights, its 
liberal framework may not fit easily into what has so far been an a-liberal polity.105
Fifteen years into democracy, Chanock’s words have a prophetic ring. As 
critical legal realists suggest, contestation and politics are inevitable in law. 
Judges and the legal community are part of this. How we understand the 
nature and process of the Constitution’s transformative project, and how this 
works in practice, become crucial to our ability to transform away from the 
fractured and unequal society of the past, and towards one that is more just 
and equal. Such a process of transformation needs, inter alia, to factor in the 
racial, and other deep divisions of the past and present, and to build solidar-
ity across a (positively) diverse society. As Ruti Teitel suggests, transitional 
jurisprudence must be both backward- and forward-looking, situated between 
the past and the future.106 This does not mean that it is a linear process, but is 
both uncertain and contradictory, involving the complexities, interruptions 
and continuities of the past and present injustice.107
It is perhaps in discussions about the process of transformation that criti-
cal legal realism/studies has had the most traction amongst South African 
academics. This is present in some of the critiques of the Court’s failure to 
engage values,108 as well as in writing about the nature of transformation.109 
Our reading of critical legal realism in South Africa, and its connections to 
an egalitarian political project, would lead us to disagree with the postmodern 
concern with indeterminacy and uncertainty that characterises some of this 
work,110 arguing rather for an acknowledgement of the politics of transforma-
tion and the very real way in which, because different conceptions of social 
and constitutional values regulate power, status and access to resources, legal 
struggles materially affect distribution within our society.
Advancing the Constitution’s transformative project thus requires legal and 
political work. In general, this should take place within a process that is open 
105 Chanock (note 41 above) 428.
106 R Teitel ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation’ (1997) 106 Yale 
LJ 2009. Teitel writes of public law; of course, for legal realists, this is equally true of private law.
107 The ‘bridge’ metaphor in South Africa was strongly criticised by P de Vos ‘A Bridge too Far? 
History as Context in the Interpretation of the South African Constitution’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 1; A J 
van der Walt ‘Dancing with Codes – Protecting, Developing and Reconstructing Property Rights in 
a Constitutional State’ (2001) 118 SALJ 258; W le Roux ‘Bridges, Clearings and Labyrinths: The 
Architectural Framing of Post-Apartheid Constitutionalism’ (2004) 19 SA Public Law 629. 
108 Cockrell (note 61 above); Woolman (note 61 above). 
109 H Botha ‘Freedom and Constraint in Constitutional Adjudication’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 249.
110 See, for example, K van Marle ‘The spectacle of post-apartheid constitutionalism’ (2007) 16 Griffiths 
Law Review 411; ‘Transformative constitutionalism as/ & critique’ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch Law 
Review and the early writings of J van der Walt in Law & Sacrifice (2005).
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and deliberative, enabling ongoing engagement over the meaning and place 
of the rights and values of the Constitution. If this project is to continue in 
a manner that values the principles of liberal democracy, whilst pursuing a 
more egalitarian goal in relation to the deep poverty and inequality of our 
society, then we suggest the following is inspired by the insights of critical 
legal realism.
Firstly, there is a continuing need to assert the genesis of the Constitution, 
as a product of local struggle and a consensus on shared values that would 
govern the new democracy. Secondly, these values must be developed, not 
as universal principles imposed from above, but as values that have mean-
ing and relevance to different communities. This should be achieved through 
deliberative mechanisms that encourage participation and debate. Courts are 
expected to articulate clear meanings and reasoned justifications that enable 
public debate. Thirdly, courts should be prepared to interrogate the entire legal 
system in line with constitutional values. All power, both public and private, 
is subject to new norms. Finally, courts must ensure that the Constitution is 
given meaning through effective remedies. This requires a robust approach 
to the remedial function, one that avoids undue deference to the doctrine of 
separation of powers.
Courts have been reluctant, for example, to include a structural interdict 
in an order on the grounds that this form of remedy may infringe the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, as a supervising court will then usurp the functions 
of executive authorities. However, if the doctrine of separation of powers is 
reconfigured in terms of constitutional democracy in which courts are in a 
dialogic partnership to the legislature and the executive, this form of remedy 
should be embraced rather then eschewed by the courts.
However, the courts remain only part of the wider picture. Law does not 
exist outside of politics. Just as jurisprudence is based on contested norms 
and values, so too will struggles that take place in the courtroom always need 
to be resolved politically. Socio-economic rights provide a particularly good 
example of this.111 The law and courts remain important places to defend val-
ues, but this also needs to be taken into political domain.
v  ConClusion
In 1971, Dugard turned to legal realism to better understand the nature of the 
apartheid legal system. Nearly 40 years later, we argue that (critical) real-
ism provides crucial insights for understanding the democratic legal order, its 
constitutional jurisprudence, the limits of its transformational impetus and 
the challenges facing our fledgling democracy.
111 See M Heywood ‘Preventing Mother to Child HIV Transmission in SA: Background, Strategies 
and Outcomes of the TAC case against the Minister of Health (2003) 19 SAJHR 278; ‘Shaping, 
Breaking and making the Law in a Campaign for a National HIV/AIDS Treatment Plan’ in P Jones 
& K Stokke (eds) Democratising Development: the Politics of Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa (2005).
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In particular, we have argued that critical realism enables a legal method 
that enhances the transformative potential of the Constitution, as well as a 
way of understanding the legally and politically contested nature of the 
Constitution. Adopting a critical realist approach to law and adjudication will, 
we suggest, nudge the democratic project in positive directions.
At the same time, we are ill-equipped to do so. Despite Dugard’s insights 
many years ago, South African lawyers and academics have not taken up real-
ist concerns seriously. Even progressive lawyers have only recently begun 
to embrace the methodological implications of critical legal realism.112 As a 
result, few lawyers and scholars are trained to engage constitutional values in 
legal argument and to deconstruct the law – especially private law – to reveal 
the power relations underneath. We are thus left with a fragile and incoher-
ent jurisprudence, especially in private law. Not only are we unclear on the 
role and content of values, but we have generated little debate about how the 
inherited private law reinforces power relations in society.
While there might have been strategic reasons for refraining from a 
realist critique of private law in the 1980s, the post-apartheid, democratic 
Constitution demands such as approach. Had we followed Dugard’s call to 
realism 40 years ago, and embraced its implications both for legal education 
and for legal practice, we might have found ourselves better able to meet the 
challenges of transformation today.
112 Liebenberg (note 49 above).
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